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Mistaken eyewitness identifications in Maryland
By david E. aaronson 
and Julia M. Fox
Mistaken eyewitness identifications played 
the primary role in 236 of the 329 (72 per-
cent) post-conviction DNA exonerations in the 
United States, according to Innocence Project 
statistics, making it the number one cause 
of wrongful convictions. The real perpetra-
tors were apprehended in 159 of these cases. 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-
imprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_
start=0&c4=Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2015). Since only a fraction of criminal 
cases involve biological evidence that can be 
subject to DNA testing, most wrongfully con-
victed persons have little chance of proving 
their innocence. Wrongful convictions based on 
mistaken eyewitness identifications are espe-
cially serious for racial minorities, who make 
up approximately 70 percent of the wrongfully 
convicted. Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Dangers of 
Eyewitnesses for the Innocent: Learning from 
the Past and Projecting into the Age of Social 
Media, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 769, 770 (2012). 
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Maryland is not exempt from eye-
witness misidentification. In this 
state, Kirk Bloodsworth became the 
first man to be exonerated after being 
sentenced to death. At the age of 
22, Bloodsworth was arrested after 
an anonymous call suggested that 
he was responsible for the rape and 
murder of a young girl. Although no 
physical evidence tied Bloodworth 
to the murder, witnesses testified 
that they had seen him with the vic-
tim. Bloodsworth spent nine years in 
prison before he was released based 
on DNA evidence. Kirk Bloodsworth, 
Innocence Project, http://www.inno-
cenceproject.org/cases-false-impris-
onment/kirk-bloodsworth (last vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2015).
Other examples of wrongful con-
victions based on eyewitness identi-
fications in Maryland include Larry 
Lane Hugee, who was arrested for 
the robbery of a Dollar Tree. Hugee, 
who had prior convictions for theft 
and possession of a weapon, had 
been questioned by police in the 
strip mall where Dollar Tree was 
located about a week prior to the 
robbery. Police put Hugee’s photo-
graph into a photographic lineup, 
and although the robber’s face was 
covered with a ski mask during the 
commission of the crime, witnesses 
identified Hugee as the robber. Larry 
Lane Hugee, the National Registry 
of Exonerations, http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/
pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4172 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
Jerry Jenkins was another 
Maryland victim of witness misiden-
tification who was falsely impris-
oned for rape. Jenkins, who was 
being held in Charles County Jail 
following his arrest for an unrelated 
crime, was interviewed in relation 
to the rape. Despite having taken 
a photo during their interview of 
Jenkins, police put a five-year-old 
photograph of him into a photo-
graphic array, resulting in the victim 
saying he “looked like” the attacker. 
Although at trial, the victim said she 
could not positively identify Jenkins, 
he was convicted and spent approxi-
mately 26 years in prison. Jerry 
Lee Jenkins, the National Registry 
of Exonerations, http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4191 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2015). 
These stories and others demon-
strate the need to re-evaluate current 
eyewitness identification procedures 
in Maryland to help reduce wrongful 
convictions.
The need for additional 
Safeguards to reduce the 
likelihood of Wrongful 
Convictions Based on 
Mistaken Eyewitness 
Identification(s) 
There is an emerging con-
sensus, including within the 
U.S. Department of Justice, the 
National Research Council of the 
National Academies of Sciences 
(Identifying the Culprit: Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification, 2014), and 
the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (National Summit 
on Wrongful Convictions: Building a 
Systemic Approach to Prevent Wrongful 
Convictions, August 2013), that rec-
ognizes the need and importance of 
additional safeguards to reduce the 
likelihood of mistaken eyewitness 
identifications. These reforms need 
to be initiated through state courts 
and legislatures, rather than rely on 
federal intervention.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8-1 
decision in Perry v. New Hampshire, 
565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012), 
affirmed a defendant’s conviction for 
breaking into a car in a parking lot. 
Defendant alleged that the circum-
stances surrounding his identifica-
tion were suggestive because, among 
other things, the eyewitness had 
identified him while he was standing 
next to a police officer in the park-
ing lot. Resolving a conflict among 
federal and state courts, the Court 
held that a trial judge is not required 
under the Due Process Clause to con-
duct a preliminary assessment of “the 
reliability of an eyewitness identifica-
tion when the identification was not 
procured under unnecessarily sug-
gestive circumstances arranged by 
law enforcement.” Id. at 730.
The Court in Perry reaffirmed the 
holdings of its earlier cases, especially 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 
375 (1972) and Manson v. Brathwaite, 
432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977). 
Under these cases, the Due Process 
Clause does not require that an iden-
tification infected by improper police 
influence be automatically excluded. 
“If the indicia of reliability are strong 
enough to outweigh the corrupting 
effect of the police-arranged sugges-
tive circumstances,” then the pre-
trial “identification evidence ordi-
narily will be admitted and the jury 
will ultimately determine its worth.” 
Perry, at 720. Trial courts often follow 
a two-step procedure: (1) “wheth-
er the police used an unnecessarily 
suggestive identification procedure”; 
and (2) “if they did,… whether [that] 
procedure so tainted the resulting 
identification as to render it unreli-
able and thus inadmissible.” Id. at 
722. Maryland follows this two-step 
procedure. See Chambers v. State, 81 
Md. App. 210, 567 A.2d 458 (1989). 
Even when the pre-trial identification 
is found to be inadmissible due to its 
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suggestive nature, if the subsequent 
in-court identification is not a prod-
uct of the tainted identification, but 
is based on an independent source 
such as a clear view of the suspect 
at the occurrence of the crime, the-in 
court identification may be admit-
ted. See, e.g., Foster v. State 272 Md. 
273, 323 A.2d 419 (1974).In Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243 
(1997), the Supreme Court provided 
a list of “factors to weigh against the 
corrupting effect of a suggestive iden-
tification,” including: opportunity to 
view, degree of attention, accuracy 
of the description, witness’s level of 
certainty, and time between the crime 
and confrontation. Id. at 114-16, 97 S. 
Ct. at 2253-54.
In Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting 
opinion in Perry, she stated that it 
is not merely the suggestive act that 
creates a Due Process concern, but 
the effect of a suggestive act on the 
reliability of a resulting identifica-
tion. Perry, at 731. Conduct that is 
intentionally suggestive or inadver-
tently suggestive can lead to the same 
unfair result. Referring to the numer-
ous scientific studies on the topic of 
reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions, she stated: “Over the past three 
decades, more than two thousand 
studies related to eyewitness identifi-
cation have been published. One state 
supreme court recently appointed a 
special master to conduct an exhaus-
tive survey of the current state of 
the scientific evidence and conclud-
ed that ‘(t)he research…is not only 
extensive’ but ‘it represents the gold 
standard in terms of the applicability 
of social science research to law,’” Id. 
at 738 (citing State v. Henderson, 208 
N.J. 208, 283, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (2011)).
At least one state court has rejected 
the holding in Perry v. New Hampshire, 
supra, on state evidence grounds, 
finding that an identification should 
not be admitted when it arises from 
“especially suggestive circumstanc-
es” other than police procedures. In 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 
228, 21 N.E.3d 157 (2014), the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
stated: “Our reliance on common-
law principles of fairness to sup-
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press an identification made under 
‘especially suggestive circumstances’ 
even where the circumstances did not 
result from improper police activity is 
also in contrast with the United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.” Id. at 
235, 21 N.E.3d at 165.
State v. Henderson, the landmark 
case decided by the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey and cited by Justice 
Sotomayor in Perry v. New Hampshire, 
revised the framework for admis-
sion of eyewitness identifications by 
“allowing judges to consider all rel-
evant factors that affect reliability in 
deciding whether an identification 
is admissible” and departing from 
a rule that is heavily weighted by 
factors that can be affected by sug-
gestiveness. 208 N.J. 208, 288, 27 A.3d 
872, 919 (2011). The new test allows 
all relevant variables to be explored 
at pretrial hearings when there is evi-
dence of suggestiveness, and calls for 
courts to develop and use enhanced 
jury instructions so that jurors can 
evaluate eyewitness identification 
evidence properly. Id.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in State 
v. Lawson, went further by requiring 
Oregon courts to consider all factors 
that can affect an eyewitness identifi-
cation and employ remedies, such as 
limiting the eyewitness’s testimony 
and permitting expert testimony to 
explain the science behind identifica-
tions. 352 Or. 724, 761-62, 291 P.3d 
673, 697 (2012). It also instructed 
trial courts to impose remedies if 
the defendant establishes that he/she 
would be unfairly prejudiced by the 
evidence. Id.
Building on that momentum, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut, in 
State v. Guilbert, held that the reli-
ability of eyewitness identifications 
is often not a matter that the average 
juror is familiar with, and the admis-
sion of an expert witness on that issue 
“does not invade the providence of 
the jury to determine what weight 
to give evidence.” 306 Conn. 218, 
251-52, 49 A.3d 705, 731 (2012). The 
Court held that the trial court abused 
its discretion by concluding that an 
expert witness’s testimony about the 
reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion concerned matters of common 
knowledge. Id. at 259, 49 A.3d at 735.
Pre-trial and Trial 
Safeguards to reduce the 
likelihood of Wrongful 
Convictions Based on 
Mistaken Eyewitness 
Identification(s)
According to Deborah Davis and 
Elizabeth Loftus, eyewitness identi-
fications are very rarely suppressed. 
Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, 
The Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the 
Innocent: Learning from the Past and 
Projecting into the Age of Social Media, 
46 New Eng. L. Rev. 769, 775-76 (2012). 
In New Jersey v. Henderson, supra, the 
Report of the Special Master, No. 
A-8-08 (June 18, 2010) found only one 
New Jersey appellate decision, unre-
ported, that applied the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 
test to suppress an eyewitness iden-
tification. The Report concluded: 
“Because the test allows…a finding 
of reliability notwithstanding imper-
missible suggestiveness, it appears 
to be of little value in weeding out 
unreliable identifications.” Id. at 78.
There are two viable avenues to 
reduce the likelihood and impact of 
mistaken eyewitness identifications: 
(1) improve pre-trial police proce-
dures to reduce the likelihood that 
mistaken identifications will occur; 
and (2) in appropriate cases, trial 
judges should consider allowing 
expert witness testimony and provid-
ing eyewitness specific jury instruc-
tions to help jurors better understand 
the circumstances that may affect the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification 
evidence.
A third avenue, to modify existing 
standards and procedures so that trial 
judges will be more likely to suppress 
unduly suggestive and unreliable 
eyewitness identifications, is unlikely 
to to happen in Maryland in light of 
the Court of Appeals recent decision 
in Smiley v. State, No. 37 SEPT. TERM 
2014, 2015 WL 1000055 (Md. Mar. 9, 
2015). In a unanimous decision, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed its near-
ly 30-year-old standard that photo 
identifications be admitted unless the 
police procedure was so impermis-
sibly suggestive as to make the iden-
tification unreliable.
A. Improving Pre-trial Police 
Procedures
The Innocence Project notes that 
ten states have implemented the 
1999 reforms published by the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), 
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for 
Law Enforcement (1999) (available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/178240.pdf), a set of voluntary 
guidelines for eyewitness investiga-
tions by law enforcement. According 
to the Innocence Project, these pro-
cedures have been shown to signifi-
cantly decrease misidentifications. 
The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, 
Innocence Project, http://www.inno-
cenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-
conviction (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
The Innocence Project reports that 
Maryland has already taken steps to 
reduce and remedy wrongful con-
victions: law enforcement units that 
regularly use interrogation rooms 
capable of creating audiovisual 
July 2015         Maryland Bar Journal        31 
recordings must make reasonable 
efforts to record custodial interroga-
tions for certain crimes (see Md. Code 
Ann., Crim. Proc. 2-402); a person 
convicted of murder, manslaughter, 
or certain sexual offenses may be 
eligible for post-conviction DNA test-
ing; biological evidence must be pre-
served for certain criminal cases; and 
the Board of Public Works determines 
compensation packages for pardoned 
individuals wrongfully convicted 
(see Md. State Fin. & Proc. 10-501). 
Maryland, Innocence Project, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-
your-state-doing/MD (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2015). 
In 2014, the Maryland General 
Assembly took another important 
step by enacting legislation requir-
ing all law enforcement agencies in 
the state to adopt and implement 
policies to improve pre-trial police-
conducted eyewitness identification 
procedures. Each law enforcement 
agency within the state has until 
January 1, 2016, to adopt the Police 
Training Commission’s Eyewitness 
Identification Model Policy or to 
adopt and implement its own pol-
icy that complies with Md. Code 
Ann., Public Safety § 3-506.1. The 
Department of State Police will then 
compile the written policies and 
allow public inspection. Md. Code 
Ann., Public Safety § 3-506; Public 
Safety—Eyewitness Identification—
Procedures, 2014 Maryland Laws Ch. 
202 (H.B. 1200).
The new legislation has some 
shortcomings and leaves many 
questions unanswered, among 
them: After the Department of State 
Police compiles the written poli-
cies and allows public inspection, 
which agency, if any, will be tasked 
with making sure that the policies 
are implemented, how much time 
will be allowed for implementa-
tion, and what authority will this 
agency have?; What penalties, if 
any, will be imposed for failure(s) 
to abide by the new legislation?; 
What resources will be available to 
local law enforcement agencies to 
implement the new policies?; What 
type of and how much training 
will be required to make sure that 
the procedures are properly imple-
mented, who will provide the train-
ing, and how will the training be 
conducted?; Will these procedures 
be applied to serious felonies, all 
felonies, or all cases?
Also, while sequential line-ups and 
sequential photo line-ups are dis-
cussed in the DOJ Guidelines (see 
supra at 34), they are not addressed 
in the recently enacted Maryland leg-
islation. According to the Guidelines, 
“Scientific research indicates that 
identification procedures such as 
lineups and photo arrays produce 
more reliable evidence when the 
individual lineup members or pho-
tographs are shown to the witness 
sequentially – one at a time – rather 
than simultaneously.” (see Guidelines 
at 9). Some, but not all, Maryland law 
enforcement agencies currently use 
sequential methods of presentation.
B. Trial Safeguards
• Expert Witnesses
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
majority in Perry v. New Hampshire, 
stated that the admission of expert tes-
timony helps jurors evaluate eyewit-
ness identifications and safeguards 
defendants against misidentification. 
565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 716, 729 (2012). 
The Court noted that some states 
allow defendants to present expert 
testimony on this evidence. Id. (citing 
State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, A33, 223 
P.3d. 1103, 113)(“We expect…that in 
cases involving eyewitness identifi-
cation of strangers or near-strang-
ers, trial courts will routinely admit 
expert testimony [on the dangers of 
such evidence.]”).
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in 
Perry v. New Hampshire, responded to 
the majority’s reliance on the jury to 
determine the reliability of eyewit-
ness identification evidence: “…[O]
ur cases are rooted in the assumption 
that eyewitness identifications upend 
the ordinary expectation that it is 
‘the province of the jury to weigh the 
credibility of competing witnesses’…. 
As noted, jurors find eyewitness evi-
dence unusually powerful and their 
ability to assess credibility is hin-
dered by a witness’ false confidence 
in the accuracy of his or her identifi-
cation.” 132 S.Ct 716, 737.
Maryland judges have often 
declined to admit expert testimo-
ny on eyewitness identifications. 
Interestingly, in the Kirk Bloodsworth 
case in 1986, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in declining 
to admit expert testimony on the reli-
ability of eyewitness identifications 
given the discretion of trial judges 
in the admission of expert testimony. 
Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 186, 
512 A.2d 1056, 1067 (1986). The trial 
judge feared that the evidence would 
confuse or mislead the jury and that 
it would be of little value in helping 
the jury understand the evidence. Id. 
at 178, 512 A.2d at 1063.
More recently, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland upheld the trial court’s 
refusal to admit expert testimony on 
(1) the lack of correlation between a 
witness’s confidence and accuracy 
of that witness’s identification on 
the grounds that it offered nothing 
of value to the jury, (2) the adverse 
affect of the passage of time on 
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a witness’s ability to recall memo-
ries on the grounds that it is com-
mon knowledge, and (3) the adverse 
affect of stress on one’s recollection 
of memories on the grounds that 
it would be confusing to the jury. 
Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 398, 421-22, 
987 A.3d 98, 115 (2010). 
Furthermore, in Smiley v. State, 
No. 37 SEPT. TERM 2014, 2015 WL 
1000055 (Md. Mar. 9, 2015), the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the decision of 
the Court of Special Appeals, 216 Md. 
App. 1, 84 A.3d 190 (2014) and upheld 
the trial court’s refusal to allow expert 
witnesses to testify on scientific 
knowledge concerning memory. The 
Court of Appeals declined to adopt 
the theories and methodologies of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in State 
v. Henderson, supra, either as a mat-
ter of State constitutional or eviden-
tiary law. Id. at *7. However, the court 
declared that “trial courts should rec-
ognize these scientific advances in 
exercising their discretion whether to 
admit such expert testimony in a par-
ticular case.” Id. at *13 (quoting Bomas 
v. State, 412 Md. at 416, 987 A.2d at 
112 (2010).
• Eyewitness Specific Jury 
Instructions
Eyewitness Specific Jury Instructions
The court in Henderson v. State 
stated that expert testimony might 
be less necessary with the use of 
focused eyewitness identification 
jury instructions. 208 N.J 208, 219, 27 
A.3d 872, 878 (2011). An important 
judicial function is educating the 
jury through the use of jury instruc-
tions. Currently, Maryland cases do 
not recognize the need to inform 
jurors of specific factors that may 
affect the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications. A judge need not 
give a requested instruction if he/
she believes the matter is already 
covered by instructions given. Md. 
Rule 4-325; see e.g. Gunning v. State, 
374 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374 (1997). 
Maryland judges often choose not to 
give these jury instructions because 
they classify certain eyewitness iden-
tification issues as “common sense.” 
See e.g. Smiley v. State, 216 Md. App. 
1, 38, 84 A.3d 190, 211-12 (2014), aff’d 
No. 37 SEPT. TERM 2014, 2015 WL 
1000055, n. 11 (Md. Mar. 9, 2015).
Henderson, however, requires trial 
judges, in appropriate circumstanc-
es, to instruct juries on factors that 
increase the risk of eyewitness mis-
identifications. Henderson v. State, 
208 N.J 208, 27 A.3d 872 (2011). The 
court appointed a Special Master 
who submitted a report on her 
findings on eyewitness identifica-
tions that the court used to create 
its model instructions. See State v. 
Henderson, N.J. Supreme Court, No. 
A-8-08 (Special Master’s Report).
Two years later, the United States 
Supreme Court in Perry v. New 
Hampshire recognized the impor-
tance of these instructions. While 
refusing to enlarge the domain of 
Due Process, the Court specifical-
ly noted that eyewitness-specific 
jury instructions, adopted by many 
courts as safeguards built into the 
system, prevent juries from putting 
too much weight on eyewitness tes-
timony. 132 S.Ct. 716, 729 (2012).
In Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 
Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897 (2015), 
the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts affirmed the defen-
dant’s conviction, holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by failing to give the defen-
dant’s proferred eyewitness identi-
fication jury instructions. However, 
with the guidance of the Report and 
Recommendations of the Supreme 
Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence (July 25, 
2013) (Study Group Report), avail-
able at http:///www.mass.gov/
courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-
evidence-report-2013.pdf, the court 
concluded “that there are scientific 
principles regarding eyewitness 
identification that are ‘so generally 
accepted’ that it is appropriate in 
the future to instruct juries regard-
ing these principles so that they 
may apply the principles in their 
evaluation of eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence.” 470 Mass. at 354, 22 
N.E.3d at 900. In an unusual turn, 
the court included as an Appendix 
to its opinion a provisional jury 
instruction regarding eyewitness 
identification evidence. . Id. at 354, 
22 N.E.3d at 900-01.
In light of the recently published 
Gomes opinion and one of the co-
authors recently published pre-
Gomes instructions for Maryland, the 
authors recommend the following 
proposed model jury instructions 
for Maryland trial judges to consider 
in appropriate cases. These instruc-
tions are based on integrating some 
of the provisional jury instructions 
in Gomes with the co-author’s pub-
lished jury instructions, especially 
§ 2.56, Identification of Defendant 
by Eyewitnesses. See related jury 
instructions: § 2.57(A), Identification 
of Defendant by Single Eyewitness; 
§ 2.61, Photographic Identification; 
§ 2.62, Identification Based on 
Defendant’s “Mug Shots”: No 
inference to be Drawn from Police 
Possession; § 2.23, Credibility of 
Witnesses; and § 2.57(B), Cross-Racial 
Identification of Defendant. David 
E. Aaronson, Maryland Criminal 
Jury Instructions and Commentary 
(2014-2015 ed., LexisNexis). See 
also David E. Aaronson, Cross-
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Racial Identification of Defendants in 
Criminal Cases: A Proposed Model Jury 
Instruction, 23 Crim. Just. 4 (2008). 
 The bracketed language in the 
following instruction should be used 
only when the facts of the case sug-
gest that the additional guidance may 
be helpful to the jurors.
• Proposed Model Jury Instruction 
on Eyewitness Identification of 
Defendant
You have heard evidence regard-
ing the identification of the 
defendant(s) as the person(s) who 
committed the crime. The burden 
is on the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt not only that the 
offense(s) [was] [were] committed, 
but also that ______________(insert 
name(s) of defendant(s)) (is)(are) 
the person(s) who committed (it) 
(them). 
You must determine wheth-
er the eyewitness testimony 
of_________________ (insert name(s) 
of eyewitness(es)) (is) (are) both truth-
ful and accurate. You may consider 
any evidence relating to (his)(her)
(their) identification(s), including 
to what extent any witness’s testi-
mony should be believed. 
A number of factors may affect the 
accuracy of an identification of the 
defendant by an alleged eyewit-
ness. To decide whether the iden-
tification testimony is sufficiently 
reliable evidence, you may con-
sider the following factors: [Include, 
if applicable, the following factors:] 
1. The witness’s opportunity to 
observe the criminal act(s) and 
the person(s) committing it 
(them) including:
a. the length of the encounter;
b. the distance between the 
various parties;
c. the witness’s eyesight and 
the lighting conditions at the 
time;
d. the witness’s state of mind 
at the time of the offense 
[including the use of alcohol 
or drugs by the witness];
e. the witness’s degree of 
attention to the perpetrator 
during the  commission of 
the offense; 
f. [whether the perpetrator 
had a distinctive face or fea-
ture;]
g. [any disguises worn by the 
perpetrator];  
h. the accuracy of any prior 
description of the person 
committing the offense given 
by the witness, including 
any discrepancies between 
the prior description and the 
defendant’s actual descrip-
tion; and 
i. whether the witness pre-
viously knew or had seen 
the person committing the 
offense before the incident 
or before the identification. 
[Prior exposure to a person 
can help a witness recognize 
that person. But it can also 
lead to a mistaken identi-
fication if the witness con-
fuses people (he)(she) saw at 
different time(s) or place(s). 
You should consider how 
many times the witness 
had seen the defendant and 
under what circumstanc-
es. It is for you to decide 
whether the prior contact 
between the witness and the 
defendant makes the wit-
ness identification more 
accurate, less accurate, or 
had no effect.] 
2. You heard testimony that 
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_____________ (insert name(s) of 
witness(es)) made a statement at 
the time (he) (she)(they) identi-
fied the defendant about (his)
(her)(their)level of certainty that 
the (person)(person shown in the 
photograph) is, in fact, the per-
son who committed the crime. 
In general, a witness’s level of 
confidence may or may not be 
an indication of the reliability of 
the identification. It is for you 
to determine, based on all of the 
circumstances in evidence, how 
much weight to give to the wit-
ness’s level of confidence. 
3. Any earlier or later identifica-
tion by the witness that occurred 
out of court and the circumstanc-
es surrounding that identifica-
tion, including:
a. the length of time that 
elapsed between the crime 
and the identification;
b. the witness’s state of mind 
when making the identifica-
tion;
c. any suggestive circumstances 
that may have influenced 
the witness [and any 
statements or actions by 
law enforcement officers 
concerning the identification 
or the identification 
procedure].
 
4. [Any failure of a witness to 
make identification, or a mis-
identification by the witness].
5. [If you determine that 
__________’s (insert name 
of witness(es)) out-of-court 
identification(s) is(are) not reli-
able, you may still consider 
___________’s (insert name of 
witness(es)) in-court identifica-
tion if you find that to be reli-
able. However, unless the iden-
tification here in court resulted 
from ________’s (insert name of 
witness(es)) observation(s) or 
perception(s) of a perpetrator 
during the commission of an 
offense rather than being the 
product of an impression gained 
at an out-of-court identifica-
tion procedure such as a (line-
up)(photo lineup), it should be 
afforded no weight. The ultimate 
issues of the trustworthiness of 
both in-court and out-of-court 
identifications are for you, the 
jury to decide.] 
6. [You heard evidence that a 
weapon was involved in the com-
mission of the alleged crime(s) 
of ______________ (insert alleged 
criminal offense(s)), namely a 
_______________ (insert type of 
weapon alleged to be used). You 
must decide whether the wit-
ness saw this weapon during the 
incident and the circumstances 
surrounding the witness’s per-
ception of the weapon. In gen-
eral, a weapon can distract the 
witness and take the witness’s 
attention away from the perpe-
trator’s face, particularly if the 
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weapon is directed at the wit-
ness. As a result, if the crime is 
of short duration, the presence of 
a visible weapon may reduce the 
accuracy of identification. In lon-
ger events, this distraction may 
decrease as the witness adapts 
to the presence of the weapon 
and focuses on other details. It is 
solely for you to determine, con-
sidering all the facts and circum-
stances in evidence, whether a 
weapon did distract the witness 
and, if so, how much weight to 
give to this factor.] 
7.[Another factor to consider 
about the accuracy of a wit-
ness’s perception is stress or 
fear. Although moderate levels 
of stress may improve focus in 
some circumstances, high lev-
els of stress or fear can have a 
negative effect on a witness’s 
ability to make an accurate 
identification.]
8. [When the witness and the per-
petrator are of a different race, 
see David Aaronson, Maryland 
Criminal Jury Instruction and 
Commentary (2014-2015 ed., 
LexisNexis) § 2.57(B), Cross-Racial 
Identification of Defendant.]
9. Any other factors that have 
been brought to your attention 
[by (expert testimony; other] and 
any evidence that you conclude 
bears upon the accuracy of the 
witness’s in-court or out-of court 
identification of the defendant. 
You may consider any other 
direct or circumstantial evidence 
that may be relevant to the iden-
tification of the person who com-
mitted the offense(s) charged 
and either supports or does not 
support the identification by the 
witness(es).
[When the evidence raises 
a question about whether the 
defendant was the person who 
committed the alleged crime(s), 
the identification of the defen-
dant by a single eyewitness, if 
believed beyond a reasonable 
doubt, can be sufficient evidence 
of defendant’s identification.] 
You must scrutinize the evi-
dence relating to the identifi-
cation of the defendant with 
great care. You may consider the 
credibility or lack of credibility 
of the identifying witness, all 
of the circumstances surround-
ing a witness’s identification of 
the defendant, and any other 
facts and circumstances that you 
deem relevant to determine the 
reliability of the identification. 
You alone are to decide whether 
(a)(any) witness[es] [has] [have] 
adequately identified the defen-
dant as the perpetrator of the 
offense. The weight and suffi-
ciency to be given to identifica-
tion testimony is a matter solely 
for your determination.
While this proposed jury instruc-
tion is more detailed than those 
generally used, it is much easier for 
a trial judge to modify or delete lan-
guage from a pattern jury instruc-
tion when it is not needed than to 
draft a more detailed instruction 
when it is needed. 
Conclusion
As a result of 30 years of scientific 
research and thousands of studies, a 
scientific consensus exists on many 
of the factors affecting the reliabil-
ity of eyewitness identifications. 
Courts, legislatures, police depart-
ments, prosecutors, the defense bar, 
and legal scholars are assessing the 
implications for the criminal justice 
system. Mistaken eyewitness iden-
tifications are the leading cause of 
wrongful convictions, playing the 
primary role in nearly three-quarters 
of post-conviction DNA exonera-
tions in the United States. 
Building on legislation enacted 
in Maryland in 2014, police depart-
ments should be encouraged to 
adopt and implement the best prac-
tices when conducting eyewitness 
pre-trial identification procedures. 
At trial, judges should consid-
er admitting expert testimony in 
appropriate cases to better educate 
jurors on factors that affect the reli-
ability of eyewitness identifications. 
Also, detailed jury instructions, 
such as the proposed model jury 
instructions recommended above, 
may better educate jurors on the fac-
tors affecting the reliability of eye-
witness identifications and reduce 
the need for expert testimony. Taken 
together, the above steps can reduce 
wrongful convictions based on mis-
taken eyewitness identifications in 
Maryland. 
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